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INTRODUCTION
Contrary to Respondent's assertion, Petitioners have not
asked this Court to create an exception to the jurisdictional
requirement for finality.

Rather, Petitioners ask this Court to

interpret the term "final" in a manner that is fair as well as
consistent with case law and governing statutes.

Like federal

courts, this Court can adopt the Collateral Order Doctrine as a
practical construction of the finality requirement in order to
adjudicate claims that finally determine an important issue,
separate from the merits of the case and that are effectively
unreviewable on appeal.

Unlike parties to a trial, who can seek

a discretionary appeal for such claims under Rule 5 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, parties to this administrative
hearing have no avenue for seeking a discretionary appeal.

As a

result, Petitioners will forever lose the opportunity to preserve
their statutory and constitutional rights unless this Court
reviews the substantive claims in the Petition for Review.
Despite this Court's Order for plenary presentation of the
case and full briefing of the issues involved therein, Respondent
has merely briefed the jurisdictional issue raised by the Court's
Motion for Summary Disposition.

Petitioners, therefore, request

this Court to vacate the Order Converting the Citations to a
Formal Adjudicative Proceeding once the Court resolves the
jurisdictional issue.

ARGUMENT
I.

THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT THE COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE AS AN
EQUITABLE CONSTRUCTION OF THE FINALITY REQUIREMENT.
A.

Applying the Collateral Order Doctrine is a Matter of
Statutory Construction.

Respondent correctly asserts that this Court's jurisdiction
arises from Utah Code Ann. §§

78-2a-3(2) and 63-46b-16(1), which

only permit review of "final" agency orders.

However, Respondent

incorrectly concludes that this Court has no authority to
interpret the term "final."

It is axiomatic that a court has

authority to interpret the statute which defines its own
jurisdiction and Petitioners merely ask this Court to do so here.
Contrary to Respondent's assertions otherwise, the
Collateral Order Doctrine is nothing more than an interpretation
of the statutory term "final." Adopting the Collateral Order
Doctrine is therefore well within the purview of this Court.

For

almost fifty years, federal courts have applied the Doctrine as a
"practical rather than a technical construction" of the finality
requirement.

Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S.

541, 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221 (1949).

The Cohen Court recognized that

a rigid, inflexible definition deprives a party the opportunity
to adjudicate claims that are "too important to be denied review
and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate
consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated."
Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546.
155364

Therefore, a decision that conclusively
2

resolves an important issue which is completely separate from the
merits of the underlying action and which is effectively
unreviewable on appeal is considered final for purposes of
federal appellate review.

Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731,

742, 102 S.Ct. 2690 (1982).
Utah courts should adopt the Collateral Order Doctrine
because they have consistently interpreted the finality
requirement to mean the same thing as federal courts.

In Cohen,

the United States Supreme Court recognized that 28 U.S.C. § 1291
permitted appeals only from "final decisions of the district
courts."

Cohen. 337 U.S. at 546. As a matter of statutory

interpretation, the Court construed the "final decision"
requirement to preclude appellate review "[s]o long as the matter
remains open, unfinished or inconclusive."

Id.

Utah appellate

courts have similarly interpreted the use of "final" under the
Utah Administrative Procedures Act ("UAPA").

In Sloan v. Board

of Review. 781 P.2d 463 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), this Court
determined that "an order of [an] administrative agency is not
final so long as it reserves something for the agency for further
decision."

Id. at 464; see also Barney v. Division of

Occupational and Professional Licensing. 828 P.2d 542, 544 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992).

Since the United States Supreme Court crafted

the Collateral Order Doctrine under a definition of "final"
virtually identical to that articulated in Sloan and Barney. this
155364
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Court's adoption of the Doctrine would be entirely consistent
with Utah precedents as a practical and fair construction of that
term.
Respondent argues that this Court is constrained to apply a
rigid, technical interpretation to UAPA's finality requirement.
Petitioners, on the other hand, offer a practical and fair
construction, which federal courts have long used to resolve
important issues that would otherwise be unreviewable on appeal.
Unless this Court adopts the Collateral Order Doctrine,
Petitioners will be forced to adjudicate their citations in the
wrong forum and the Division will be permitted to violate its own
rules unchecked.

Most importantly, once Petitioners are forced

through the unlawful procedure, they will have suffered the harm
they now seek to avoid.

Accordingly, Petitioners ask the Court

to take this opportunity to adopt a fair and practical
construction of the finality requirement and to consider
favorably the Petition for Review.
B.

Justice Requires Application of the Doctrine in the
Absence of any Alternative Route for Review.

Administrative agency proceedings require application of the
Collateral Order Doctrine because, unlike trial proceedings,
parties cannot petition for discretionary appellate review of

155364
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i s s u e s a f f e c t i n g important r i g h t s .

See Utah R. App. P. 5 & 18. x

Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedures permits p a r t i e s
the "opportunity t o convince an a p p e l l a t e court t h a t the i s s u e
r a i s e d i s so important t h a t review p r i o r t o f u l l adjudication of
the case i s j u s t i f i e d or t h a t the order w i l l escape review
a l t o g e t h e r if an appeal i s not allowed."

Tyler v. Department of

Human Services, 874 P.2d 119, 120 (Utah 1994).

Yet, Rule 18

deprives P e t i t i o n e r s of t h a t opportunity in t h e i r a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
proceeding.

The absence of any chance for review begs for a

p r a c t i c a l c o n s t r u c t i o n of the f i n a l i t y requirement and for
a p p l i c a t i o n of the C o l l a t e r a l Order Doctrine.
Utah a p p e l l a t e courts have not yet had an opportunity to
apply the C o l l a t e r a l Order Doctrine in a case where p e t i t i o n e r s
have no access t o a d i s c r e t i o n a r y appeal.

In Tyler v. Department

of Human S e r v i c e s . 874 P.2d 119 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme

These rules read in pertinent part as follows:
Rule 5. Discretionary appeals from interlocutory orders.
(a) Petition for permission to appeal. An appeal from an
interlocutory order may be sought by any party by f i l i n g
a petition for permission to appeal from the
interlocutory order with the clerk of the appellate
court with jurisdiction over the case within 20 days
after the entry of the order of the t r i a l court, with
proof of service on a l l other parties to the action. .

Rule 18. Applicability of other rules to review.
All provisions of these rules are applicable to review
of decisions or orders of agencies, except that Rules 3
through 8 are not applicable. . . .
155364
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Court declined adopting the C o l l a t e r a l Order Doctrine in order to
review a d i s t r i c t court discovery order. 2

The Court considered

the Doctrine, but u l t i m a t e l y r e j e c t e d a p p l i c a t i o n in t h a t case
because the "defendants had an avenue to appeal [the]
i n t e r l o c u t o r y order under r u l e 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, which they chose not to pursue."

Id. a t 120.

In c o n t r a s t t o Tyler, absent the C o l l a t e r a l Order Doctrine,
P e t i t i o n e r s in t h i s case have no opportunity t o convince a court
t h a t important i s s u e s , which are unreviewable l a t e r , should be
addressed.

E s s e n t i a l l y , Rule 18 of the Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure deprives P e t i t i o n e r s of t h i s opportunity, which the
C o l l a t e r a l Order Doctrine i s intended t o provide.

It is patently

u n f a i r t o afford p a r t i e s in t r i a l proceedings a chance to seek
review of decisions t h a t i r r e p a r a b l y harm t h e i r r i g h t s , while
precluding the same opportunity for p a r t i e s t o an a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
proceedings.
P e t i t i o n e r s seek an opportunity to convince t h i s Court t h a t
the Division has v i o l a t e d i t s own r u l e s by placing them in a

2

Not only did the State argue for adoption of the Collateral Order
Doctrine in Tvler, see Defendant's Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary
Disposition in Tvler v. Department of Human Services at Addendum A, but the Court
in Tvler noted t h a t "the s t a t e has urged t h i s court to adopt the federal
c o l l a t e r a l order doctrine in several other cases f i l e d t h i s term." Tvler 874
P. 2d a t 119.
Respondent's contention that the P e t i t i o n for Review i s
"frivolous," therefore, i s without merit in l i g h t of the Attorney General's
attempts in previous cases to obtain appellate review of orders on the same basis
as P e t i t i o n e r s in t h i s case, namely by way of the Collateral Order Doctrine.
Indeed, Respondent a s s e r t s in i t s brief that the Collateral Order Doctrine s t i l l
has a place in Utah jurisprudence. See Brief of Respondents at 10 n . 2 .
155364
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procedural track that deprives them of important statutory and
constitution rights. Without appellate review at this stage of
the proceedings, their ability to do so will be forever lost.

In

the interest of fairness, Petitioners respectfully request this
Court to adopt the Collateral Order Doctrine.
II.

THE PETITION FOR REVIEW IS APPROPRIATELY BEFORE THIS COURT
BECAUSE IT ARISES OUT OF A FORMAL ADJUDICATION.
Respondent mischaracterizes the subject matter of the

Petition for Review as arising from an informal adjudication.
The Division converted the proceedings to a formal adjudication
and now denies that disputes between the parties arise from a
formal proceeding.

Respondent cannot have it both ways.

Petitioners seek review of two orders: (i) the Order
Converting the Citations to Formal Adjudicative Proceedings,
dated April 8, 1994, and (ii) the Department of Commerce Order on
Review, dated June 27, 1994, by which the Department refused to
consider Petitioners' request that it vacate the Conversion
Order.

See Petitioners' Brief at n.l.

The latter order arises

out of Petitioners' efforts to seek reversal of the Conversion
Order after conversion occurred.

Although the arguments in the

Petitioners' brief center on the Conversion Order, the Petition
for Review technically arises from the Department's Order on
Review.

Clearly, the Department issued its Order after the

citation proceedings had been converted to a formal adjudication

155364
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and this Court has jurisdiction to consider whether the
Department incorrectly refused to vacate the Conversion Order.
Even if the Conversion Order was the only matter before this
Court, the Court would still have jurisdiction because, as of the
time the Conversion Order came into existence, these proceedings
became formal.

Respondent points to no other point in time when

the informal proceedings ceased and the formal ones began.
Surely, Respondent is not purporting that the proceedings have
not yet become formal.

In fact, prior to this Petition for

Review, the parties had scheduled and begun discovery under the
statutes governing formal proceedings.

The formal adjudication

came into existence the instant the Conversion Order did, and
this Court, consequently, has jurisdiction to review that Order.
III. IF THIS COURT DETERMINES THAT THIS CASE ARISES FROM AN
INFORMAL ADJUDICATION, TRANSFER TO DISTRICT COURT IS PROPER.
If the Court decides that the Petition for Review arises
from an informal adjudication, and, that petition to the Court of
Appeals is improper, the correct disposition of the case is
transfer, not dismissal.

Rule 44 of the Utah Rules of Appellate

Procedure provides that if a petition for review is filed in a
court without jurisdiction "the appellate court . . . shall
transfer the case . . . to the court with appellate jurisdiction
in the case."

Accordingly, since Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-15

grants the district court appellate jurisdiction over final
155364
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orders from informal administrative proceedings, transfer to the
district court would be proper upon a finding that the Conversion
Order arose from an informal adjudication.
CONCLUSION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction over the Petition for
Review because the contested Orders arose out of a formal
proceeding.

Moreover, this Court has authority to adopt the

Collateral Order Doctrine as a practical and fair construction of
the finality requirement for jurisdiction.

Indeed, the peculiar

scheme that prohibits parties from seeking discretionary appeals
of interlocutory administrative orders begs for the application
of the Doctrine as a matter of fairness.

Petitioners, therefore,

respectfully request this Court to: (i) adopt the Collateral
Order Doctrine, (ii) address the substantive issues contained in
Petitioners' Brief, and (iii) vacate the Conversion Order.
DATED this

^ -LK

day of March, 1995.
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER

James B. Lee
Barbara K. Polich
William J. Stilling
Of and For
PARSONS BEHLE AND LATIMER
Attorneys for Petitioners

155364
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

^7 day of March, 1995,

I caused to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Petitioners' Reply Brief, to:
Robert K. Hunt
Utah Assistant Attorney General
Consumer Rights Division
230 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

d)ttW^
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Tab A

ORIGINAL

JAN GRAHAM - 1231
Attorney General
ELIZABETH KING - 4863
Assistant Attorney General
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 575-1650

FILED
OCT 7 1993
CLERK SUPREME COURT,
UTAH

Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
JAN L. TYLER,
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISPOSITION

Plaintiff and
Appellee,

Subject to Assignment to the
Court of Appeals

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
SERVICES, NORMAN G.
ANGUS, and CHARLES F.
LARSEN,

Case No. 930428

Defendants and
Appellants.

Defendants/Appellants, the State of Utah, Utah
Department of Human Services, Norman G. Angus and Charles F.
Larsen, submit the following Memorandum in Opposition to
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Disposition pursuant to Rule 10(c)
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
ARGUMENT
Plaintiff has alleged this court lacks jurisdiction to
hear this appeal as there is no final order.

Defendants concede

there is no order of determination of final judgment in this
case; nor should there be. This case is before the appellate
court based on a direct appeal as of right in accordance with the

collateral order doctrine, a recognized exception to the finality
rule.
Utah courts have never addressed the issue of whether
the collateral order doctrine forms a basis for an appeal as of
right of a non-final order.

Defendants argue the court should

extend existing law, apply the collateral order doctrine to the
facts of this case, and grant defendants a right to appeal the
trial court's order in this case.

(The Order is attached as

Exhibit A; the Defendant's Docketing Statement is attached as
Exhibit B.)
For over forty years, courts have recognized a party's
right to appeal an interlocutory order of a lower court under the
collateral order doctrine described in Cohen v. Beneficial
Indust. Loan Corp.. 337 U.S. 541, 93 L. Ed. 1528, 69 S. Ct. 1221
(1941).

For Cohen's collateral order doctrine to apply, the

lower court's order must:

(1) "conclusively determine the

disputed question;" (2) "resolve an important issue completely
separate from the merits of the action;" and (3) "be effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment."

Coopers & Lybrand

v. Livesay. 437 U.S. 463, 468, 57 L. Ed. 2d 351, 98 S. Ct. 2454
(1988).l
*In 15A C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper. Federal Practice and
Procedure 3911 at 347 (1992), the commentator's note that the
"Supreme Court's decisions establish the general contours of
collateral order doctrine, even as they permit one element or
another to be subordinated." They point out that the three-part
test in Coopers & Lybrand "is no more than a useful starting point
for analysis," id. at 351 and that "'as with so many multi-pronged
legal tests it manages to be at once redundant, incomplete and
unclear,'" id. (quoting Palmer v. City of Chicago, 806 F.2d 1316,
1318 (7th Cir. 1986), cert, denied, 481 U.S. 1049, 95 L. Ed. 2d
836, 107 S. Ct. 2180 (1987)).

A lower court's order is deemed to have conclusively
determined the disputed question if the order is "made with the
expectation that it will be the final word on the subject
addressed."

Gulf Stream Aerospace v. Mayacamas Corp., 485 U.S.

271, 277, 99 L. Ed. 2d 296, 108 S. Ct. 1133 (1988).

The trial

court's order of July 16, 1993 represents the final word on
defendant's obligation to provide exhaustive answers to discovery
requests despite conflicting language in the Government Records
Access and Management Act (GRAMA) and in Rule 26, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
The trial court's order also resolves an important
issue completely separate from the merits of the action.

The

collateral order doctrine requires that the issue be important in
a jurisprudential sense.

Nemours Foundation v. Manganaro Corp.,

New England, 878 F.2d 98, 100 (3rd Cir. 1989).

See also Nixon v.

Fitzgerald. 457 U.S. 731, 742, 73 L. Ed. 2d 349, 102 S. Ct. 2690
(1987) (collateral appeal of interlocutory order must present a
serious and unsettled question).

Given the confusion created by

GRAMA with regard to the production of documents in discovery/ an
issue which affects a large number of parties and non-parties,
and given the numbers of cases which involve the same facts and
problems, this court should review the conflicting methodology
and resolve the issue.

Thus, the question is important in a

jurisprudential sense.
Moreover, the issue of production of discovery is
separate from the merits as it is not "enmeshed in the factual
3

and legal issues comprising the plaintiff's cause of action."
Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 469.

In examining the propriety

of the trial court's order, this court need not reach the
underlying factual and legal issues regarding plaintiff's
Whistle-blower action, her claim for breach of contract, or her
allegation of sex discrimination.
Finally, the trial court's order is effectively
unreviewable on appeal.

If this court were to wait to resolve

this issue on direct appeal after a determination on the merits,
as plaintiff would have it, and if the court were then to
determine that the trial court improperly applied GRAMA and Rule
26 to compel discovery, the defendants would have permanently
lost the opportunity to resolve the collateral discovery issues
administratively without simultaneously defending this litigation
in the trial court.

Cf.

Mitchell v. Forsvth. 472 U.S. 511, 526-

27, 86 L. Ed. 2d 411, 105 S. Ct. 2806 (1985).

Thus, the

defendants have asserted a right which would be destroyed if not
vindicated before trial on the merits.

United States v.

MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860, 56 L. Ed. 2d 18, 98 S. Ct. 1547
(1978).
While it has been argued that exceptions to the final
judgment rule are unwarranted and "rise like Athena from the head
of Zeus," United States v. Taylor, 798 F.2d 1337, 1338 (10th Cir.
1986), practical application of the doctrine is consistently
encouraged.
In our view, the Cohen court asserted the
need for the practical application of [the
4

collateral order doctrine] particularly in
situations where it is clearly urgent that an
important issue . . • be decided. Thus, in
the unique instance where the issue is not
'collateral' but justice may require
immediate review, a balancing approach should
be followed to make this jurisdictional
decision. The circumstances of the instant
case require the application of such a
balancing test rather than the mechanical
analysis of the collateral order exception.
The critical inquiry is whether the danger of
injustice by delaying appellate review outweighs the Inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review.
Bender v. Clark, 744 F.2d 1424, 1427 (10th Cir. 1984), emphasis
added.
Thus, even though defendants attempt an appeal of a
"mere discovery motion," defendant's claims involve substantial
issues with broad-based concerns which should be subject to
interlocutory appeal under the Cohen exception.

Cf. United

States v. Deffenbauah Industries Inc., 957 F.2d 749, 755 (10th
Cir. 1992) (reviewing a discovery motion on appeal per the
collateral order exception to the finality rule).
CONCLUSION
Interlocutory review of this matter by either appellate
court based on the collateral order doctrine will prevent the
unnecessary prolongation of a useless and expensive response to
overbroad discovery requests and will resolve important issues
collateral to the merits in this case.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

2A
/'

day of October, 1993

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

*^yUuk*ELIZABETH KING
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy
of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DEPOSITION, this 1f^1 day of October, 1993, to the following:
Elizabeth T. Dunning
Mary J. Woodhead
WATKISS, DUNNING & WATKISS
111 East Broadway, #800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2304
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EXHIBIT A

r..v..

JUL t 6 1993
ELIZABETH T. DUNNING (3896)
MARY J. WOODHEAD (5581)
WATKISS DUNNING & WATKISS
Broadway Centre, Suite 800
111 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2304
Telephone: (801) 530-1500
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JAN L. TYLER,
Plaintiff,
ORDER
vs.

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
SERVICES, NORMAN G. ANGUS,
and CHARLES F. LARSEN,
Defendants.

Civil No. 920901254CV
Judge Richard H. Moffat

This matter came on for hearing before the Court on March 23,1993 on the Motion
of plaintiff Jan L. Tyler ('Tyler") to Compel responses to Plaintiffs Second Request for
Production of Documents and Tyler's Motion to Amend. Tyler was represented by Elizabeth
T. Dunning and Mary J. Woodhead. Defendants Department of Human Services, Norman

G. Angus and Charles F. Larsen were represented by John P. Soltis, Barbara H. Ochoa and
Carol L. C. Verdoia.
At the outset of the hearing counsel for defendants stipulated to permit Tyler's filing
her Amended Complaint which adds Tylerfs breach of contract claim.
Having reviewed the memoranda of the parties in support of and in opposition to
Tyler's Motion to Compel, having heard the arguments of counsel and being fully advised
in this matter, the Court finds that with rare exception, discovery in litigated matters is
governed by the rules of discovery and evidence and not by the provisions of the
Government Records Access and Management Act. The Court further finds that no parts
of the requested discovery are subject to any exclusionary rule or privilege at this point in
the proceedings. Therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED,
That Tyler's Motion to Compel responses to Tyler's Second Request for Production
of Documents is GRANTED/
DATED this / / »

day of

EXHIBIT B

JAN GRAHAM (1321)
Attorney General
ELIZABETH KING (4863)
Assistant Attorney General
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 575-1650
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT
JAN L. TYLER,

:

Plaintiff and
Appellee,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN
SERVICES, NORMAN G.
ANGUS, and CHARLES F.
LARSEN,

:

DOCKETING STATEMENT

:

Subject to Assignment to the
Court of Appeals

:

Civil No.

:

Defendants and
Appellants.
Defendants/Appellants, the State of Utah, Utah
Department of Human Services, Norman G. Angus and Charles F.
Larsen, submit the following docketing statement pursuant to Rule
9, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
1.

Date of Entry of Judgment or Order Appealed From:

July 16, 1993.
2.
Filed:

Nature of Post Judgment Motion (s) and Date(s)

Defendants' Memoranda in Support of Defendants' Motion

for Clarification and Reconsideration dated June 22, 1993, and
July 13, 1993.
3.

Date and Effect of Order(s) Disposing of Post

Judgment Motion(s) and Order of Determination of Final Judgment

Under Utah R. Civ, P. 54(b):

Order Denying Defendants' Motion

for Clarification and Reconsideration dated July 16, 1993, and
Minute Entry dated July 20, 1993; there is no Order of Final
Judgment.
4.

Date of Piling of Notice of Appeal:

5.

Jurisdiction:

August 13,

1993.
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction

in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (j) (1992) and
the Collateral Order Doctrine.
6.

Name of Trial Court or Agency:

Third Judicial

District Court, Salt Lake County, the Honorable Richard H. Moffat
presiding.
7.

Statement of Pacts:

This action involves a claim

by plaintiff that she was transferred from her employment with
the Department of Human Services in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 67-21-3 (the Whistle Blower Claim); that her transfer violated
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (the Title VII Claim); and includes a breach
of contract claim.
In February, 1993, plaintiff brought a motion to
compel discovery requesting that the trial court hold that the
Government Records Access and Management Act (GRAMA) does not
apply to civil discovery.

After lengthy briefing, Judge Moffat

agreed with plaintiff's interpretation of the law and held that
"discovery in litigated matters is governed by the Rules of
Discovery and Evidence and not by the provisions of the
Government Records and Management Act." (Order dated July 16,
1993.)

The Court further found that "no parts of the requested

discovery are subject to any exclusionary rule or privilege-11

(Id.)
8.

Issues for Review and Standard of Review:
A,

Whether GRAMA is applicable to civil

discovery.
(1).

How to reconcile the conflicting

provisions of GRAMA in cases involving the State as a litigant.
(2) . If GRAMA does not apply in civil
discovery, which aspects of the statutory language and of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure apply to limit discovery in this
case; i.e., (a) privilege of confidentiality; (b) relevancy
threshold.
(3).

Whether defendants are entitled to an

in-camera examination of documents in this case to determine
whether plaintiff's interest in disclosure outweighs the State's
interest in confidentiality.
B.

Whether the district court had subject matter

jurisdiction to hear plaintiff's Whistle Blower Claim in
contradiction of Utah Code Ann. § 67-21-3 (1989).
These are questions of law; therefore, this Court
must review the decision below for correctness, according it no
deference.

Ledfors v. Emery County School Dist., 849 P.2d 1162,

1162-63 (Utah 1993).
9.

Determination of Case by Supreme Court:

involves questions of first impression regarding the
interpretation of the Utah Government Records Access and
3

This case

Management Act (GRAMA), Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-2-101, ££ seq..
specifically the 1992 amendment encoded in § 63-2-207, Utah Code
Ann. and the Whistle Blower claim encoded in §§ 67-21-1, e£. seq.
Consequently, the Utah Supreme Court should retain jurisdiction
and decide this case.
10.

Determinative Law:
Statutes:

Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-2-101, ££ seq.:

Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-202, Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-204, Utah Code
Ann. § 63-2-205; § 63-2-207, § 63-2-201 (5) (a) and (b); §§ 67-211, St. seq.: and Utah Code § 78-24-8.
Rules:

Rule 26, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

Cases:

Durfey v. School Board of Education of

Wayne County School District, 604 P.2d 480 (Utah 1979); State
Road Commission v. Petty. 412 P.2d 914 (Utah 1966); Meyers v.
Salt Lake City Corp.. 747 P.2d 1058 (Utah Ct. App. 1987); Madsen
v. United Television. Inc., 801 P.2d 912 (Utah 1990); and Glasman
v. Second District Court. 80 Utah 1, 7, 12 P.2d 361, 363 (1932)
(cited with favor in State v. Perank. 191 Utah Adv. Rep. 5
(1992)) .
11.

Related Appeals:

There are no prior or related

appeals.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this jA.

day of September, 1993.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

ELIZABETH KING
\
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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